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INTRODUCTION 
This Symposium offers a welcome opportunity to consider an important 
topic with many facets.  As suggested by my title, the term 
overcriminalization is broad enough to cover laws imposing penal 
sanctions on conduct that should be solely a matter of individual morality.1  
It also includes legislation that criminalizes relatively trivial conduct, such 
as removing the tag on a mattress,2 which should be dealt with by civil 
provisions, or perhaps left to the good sense of the individual.  Many argue 
that a good deal of so-called regulatory or “white collar crime” should fall 
outside the ambit of the criminal law, to be dealt with by other bodies of 
specialized civil law, such as corporate governance, environmental, or 
election finance law.3  Another facet of overcriminalization is the enormous 
expansion of federal criminal law to cover subjects that were previously the 
exclusive province of state law.4  My purpose in this Essay is to explore 
                                                          
 1. See Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 157, 159-65 (1967) (articulating the view that policing of morals stifles the 
legitimacy of the law because such laws are largely unenforced, selectively utilized to 
punish other unrelated conduct, and involve diversion of scarce police resources). 
 2. As Stuart Green explains, consumers actually face no liability for removing tags.  
The regulations pertain to sellers.  See Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime To Tear the Tag 
Off a Mattress:  Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 
EMORY L.J. 1533, 1610 (1997). 
 3. For particularly helpful discussions, see Stuart P. Green, Moral Ambiguity in White 
Collar Criminal Law, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 501, 502  (2004) (arguing 
that crimes such as bribery, extortion, fraud, and other regulatory crimes are unlike 
traditional crimes which are unequivocally immoral); Green, supra note 1; Sanford H. 
Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic 
Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 425 (1963) (questioning the use of criminal sanctions 
in the larger scheme of economic policy formulation); PAUL ROSENZWEIG, THE HERITAGE 
LEGAL FOUNDATION LEGAL MEMORANDUM, THE OVER-CRIMINALIZATION OF SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC CONDUCT (Apr. 17, 2003) (critiquing the shift in justification for criminal 
punishment from moral to utilitarian, resulting in non-traditional punishment for acts that 
are not morally wrong or are merely negligent), available at 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/LegalIssues/lm7.cfm.  But see Kip Schlegel, David Eitle 
& Steven Gunkel, Are White-Collar Crimes Overcriminalized?  Some Evidence on the Use 
of Criminal Sanctions Against Securities Violators, 28 W. ST. U. L. REV. 117, 140 (2000-
2001) (undertaking a study of securities violations from 1984 to 1991 to conclude that there 
is no empirical support for the position that business regulatory offenses are 
overcriminalized). 
 4. For a discussion of the problems of overfederalization, see John S. Baker, Jr., State 
Police Powers and the Federalization of Local Crime, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 673, 712 (1999) 
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some common features connecting the different forms of 
overcriminalization, as well as some of the distinct aspects of each.  I will 
also touch on the related but distinct crisis of our country’s unprecedented 
and unjustifiably high rate of incarceration. 
Although morals legislation and the extension of federal criminal law 
into areas traditionally reserved to the states, such as street crime, might 
seem to bear little relationship to one another, I will argue that they reveal 
many of the same vices of overcriminalization.  I will argue that the 
common features of overcriminalization include the following:  (1) 
excessive unchecked discretion in enforcement authorities, (2) inevitable 
disparity among similarly situated persons, (3) potential for abuse by 
enforcement authorities, (4) potential to undermine other significant values 
and evade significant procedural protections, and (5) misdirection of scarce 
resources (opportunity costs).  Part I of this Essay sets the stage, describing 
the existing state morals laws and the breathtakingly broad scope of 
contemporary federal criminal law.  Part II explores the harmful 
consequences—what I call the vices—of vestigial morals legislation and 
the expanded body of federal criminal law, beginning with descriptions of 
particular state and federal prosecutions, and then broadening the analysis 
to the broader themes reflected in these cases.  Part II then turns to a 
discussion of the proper scope of federal criminal law in light of the vices 
of overcriminalization, and concludes with a series of questions about the 
application of the analysis advanced in this Essay to regulatory offenses. 
                                                          
(examining the expansion of federal criminal law from the perspective of the states); Sara 
Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few:  New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for 
Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 997-98 (1995) (arguing that increase 
in federal prosecutions overloads the federal courts and inevitably results in unjustified 
sentencing disparities between offenders in federal and state courts); Kathleen F. Brickey, 
Criminal Mischief:  The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 
1136 (1995) (espousing the view that the continued expansion of federal criminal law 
cannot be reconciled with principals of federalism); Stephen Chippendale, Note, More 
Harm Than Good:  Assessing Federalization of Criminal Law, 79 MINN. L. REV. 455, 467 
(1994) (assessing the growth of federal criminal law, and arguing that such growth increases 
costs without decreasing crime and harms the function of the federal courts); Susan R. 
Klein, Independent-Norm Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1541, 1591 (2002) 
(distinguishing issues raised by two forms of federalization: decentralization federalism and 
independent norm federalism); James A. Strazzella, The Federalization of Criminal Law:  
Task Force on the Federalization of Criminal Law, 1998 A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. JUST. L. REP. 
(providing comprehensive report on federalization of crime as well as extensive 
bibliography).  But see Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The Underfederalization of Crime, 6 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 247, 250 (1997) (arguing that the share of federal criminal law 
is actually empirically decreasing, and that crimes such as street crime should be subject to 
expanding federal prescription). 
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I. SETTING THE STAGE:   THE STATES RETAIN LAWS REGULATING 
MORALS, AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CRIMINALIZES          
VIRTUALLY EVERYTHING 
A. State Morals Legislation:  Old Laws That Stay on the Books 
One form of overcriminalization is the retention of crimes beyond the 
time that they serve an important social purpose, particularly when the laws 
deal with conduct that is common and innocuous.  Laws restricting 
behavior on Sundays,5 and prohibiting swearing6 and spitting on the street7 
                                                          
 5. The so-called “blue laws” have their origins in the Christian tradition of religious 
worship on Sundays.  Although the earliest versions of the blue laws required religious 
observances on Sunday, these provisions were replaced with laws that prohibited various 
activities to preserve Sundays as a day of rest.  Many states retain a variety of restrictions on 
Sunday activities.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-12-1 (2005) (prohibiting child, apprentice, or 
servant labor on Sunday; making illegal shooting, hunting, gaming, card playing, or racing; 
and forbidding the opening of stores, excluding pharmacies); ALA. CODE § 13A-12-2 (2005) 
(prohibiting the opening of public markets and the trading or selling of goods and 
merchandise, including livestock and cattle); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 136 § 57 (West 
2005) (prohibiting hunting on Sundays); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 9 (McKinney 2005) 
(restricting the sale of various items at particular times of day on Sunday).  For a general 
discussion of blue laws, see ALEXIS MCCROSSEN, HOLY DAY, HOLIDAY:  THE AMERICAN 
SUNDAY 1-7 (2000) (exploring the complex history of work and laws pertaining to Sunday, 
including the transition from a day of work to the day of rest, the importance of religion, and 
the conflicts between leisure, rest, and religion); Albert J. King, Sunday Law in the 
Nineteenth Century, 64 ALB. L. REV. 675, 676-88 (2000) (recounting the slackening of 
Sunday law prohibitions, including Sunday work laws, travel restrictions, and recreation 
bans resulting from the steady erosion of the religious justification for such laws by the 
courts); Marc A. Stadtmauer, Essay, Remember the Sabbath?  The New York Blue Laws and 
the Future of the Establishment Clause, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 213, 214 (1994) 
(discussing the history of New York blue laws and arguing that the few remaining New 
York blue laws, such as Sunday closing laws, do not survive constitutional scrutiny).   
The Supreme Court has generally rebuffed Establishment Clause challenges to the blue 
laws, finding them to be valid exercises of the power to protect the public health and morals, 
and reflecting the states’ legitimate concern with the health, safety, recreation, and general 
well-being of their citizens.  E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); see Suzanne 
B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking:  Before and After Lawrence v. 
Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1278-80 (2004) (utilizing the Sunday morals laws to argue 
that lawmakers should always be required to ground their legislation in hard facts rather 
than moral justifications). 
 6. A surprising number of jurisdictions retain criminal prohibitions against spitting, 
swearing, and other similar activities.  Some of the provisions regarding cursing or swearing 
appear as part of provisions aimed at disturbing the peace.  See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-
1307 (2005) (making it unlawful, inter alia, for anyone to curse, swear, or make use of any 
profane language or indecent or obscene words, or engage in any disorderly conduct in a 
wide variety of public places).   
Other provisions prohibiting swearing or profanity in public are much more clearly 
morals legislation.  Some states prohibit swearing or profanity in any public place.  See, e.g., 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-47 (2004) (prohibiting profane swearing or cursing, or use of 
vulgar or indecent language, in any public place in the presence of two or more persons); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-388 (Michie 2004) (prescribing profane cursing or swearing in 
public); W. VA. CODE ST. R. § 61-8-15 (2004) (regulating profane cursing or swearing in 
public).  Other states have bans that, on their face, apply to behavior wherever it occurs.  For 
example, a Michigan provision states that “[a]ny person who has arrived at the age of 
discretion, who shall profanely curse or damn or swear by the name of God, Jesus Christ or 
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exemplify this problem.  A significant number of states retain criminal laws 
dealing with these kinds of conduct.8  Because of the evolution of the social 
conventions regarding sexual morality, criminal laws that regulated 
traditional morality now pose many of the same issues.  The regulation of 
morals was originally a major component of American criminal law,9 but 
over the past half century these provisions have been eliminated in many 
states.  The dominant view today, championed by the drafters of the Model 
Penal Code, is that sexual chastity and fidelity within marriage should be 
treated as matters of private morality, not enforced by laws criminalizing 
fornication, cohabitation, and adultery.10 
Despite the contemporary view that sexual morality should not be 
regulated by the criminal law, a surprisingly large number of states have 
                                                          
the Holy Ghost, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.103 
(West 2004).  Oklahoma defines and punishes both blasphemy and profane swearing as 
misdemeanors.  OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 901-905 (2004).  There, blasphemy is defined as 
“wantonly uttering or publishing words, casting contumelious reproach or profane ridicule 
upon God, Jesus Christ, the Holy Ghost, the Holy Scriptures or the Christian or any other 
religion.”  tit. 21, § 901.  Oklahoma state law contains a defense for cases where it appears 
beyond reasonable doubt that the words complained of were used in the course of serious 
discussion, and with intent to make known or recommend opinions entertained by the 
accused.  tit. 21, § 902.  See also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-11-5 (2004) (enacting a general 
prohibition on profane swearing and cursing).  It seems obvious that many of these statutes 
could be challenged on First Amendment grounds, which might provoke controversies like 
those currently being litigated regarding public displays of the Ten Commandments.  See 
Christal Hoo, Thou Shalt Not Publicly Display the Ten Commandments:  A Call for a 
Reevaluation of Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 109 PA. ST. L. REV. 683, 694 
(2004) (exploring alternative approaches to Establishment Clause jurisprudence as applied 
to the display of the Ten Commandments in federal courthouses). 
 7. Although many states prohibit spitting on sidewalks and other public places, these 
provisions may be thought of as public health provisions rather than morals offenses.  See, 
e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-120 (2004) (prohibiting spitting on public transportation); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1121 (West 2004) (sanctioning spitting in or on certain public 
places); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 270, § 14 (West 2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147:18 
(2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-322 (Michie 2004); cf. Wendy K. Mariner, Public Health 
and Law:  Past and Future Vision, 28 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 525, 527 n.9 (2003) 
(referring to successful public health educational campaigns seeking to discourage public 
spitting on the streets). 
 8. See supra notes 6-7 (listing statutes outlawing profanity and expectoration). 
 9. For a general historical discussion, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1993).  A discussion of morals elements is interwoven 
throughout, but Lawrence=s discussion of the early colonial period and various anti-vice 
movements is particularly pertinent.  See id. at 32-36, 54, and 125-48. 
 10. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1980).  The commentary to the Model Penal Code, in the course of discussing the rationale 
for including no provisions on consensual sodomy, states: 
The criminal law cannot encompass all behavior that the average citizen may 
regard as immoral or deviate . . . . Verbal cruelty, lying, racial and religious biases 
in private relationships, and the kiss that betrays a marriage are but a few of the 
examples of reprehensible conduct no sensible legislator would make into a crime. 
Id. at 370.  In support of this position, the comments cite the practical consideration that 
“[e]conomic resources are finite” and should be reserved for more serious offenses, 
particularly given the difficulty of investigating and proving consensual offenses, as well as 
the broader objection to the exercise of the state’s coercive power to maintain the majority’s 
notion of morality or acceptable behavior.  Id. at 370-71. 
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not repealed laws regulating sexual morality.  Approximately one fourth of 
the states, and the District of Columbia, retain laws making fornication and 
cohabitation a crime,11 and about half of the states, and the military, make 
adultery a crime.12  Other state laws regulate the commercialization of sex, 
prohibiting prostitution and related activities.13  The Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas14 raises the issue of whether some or 
                                                          
 11. See Melanie C. Falco, Comment, The Road Not Taken:  Using the Eighth 
Amendment to Strike Down Criminal Punishment For Engaging in Consensual Sexual Acts, 
82 N.C. L. REV. 723, 738 (2004) (listing Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 18-6603 (Michie 2003)), 
Illinois (ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-8 (2003)), Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
272 § 18 (West 2003)), Mississippi (MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-29-1 (2003)), North Carolina 
(N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (2003)), North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-08 (2003)), 
South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (Law. Co-op. 2003)), Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-7-104 (2003)), Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-344 (Michie 2003)), and West Virginia 
(W. VA. CODE § 61-8-3 (2003)) along with the District of Columbia (D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-
1602 (2001)) as states that still make fornication illegal). 
 12. See id. (identifying statutes from Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.02 (West 2000)) 
and Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.335 (West 2003)) that make cohabitation a 
crime); id. at 744 (listing statutes from Alabama (ALA. CODE 13A-13-2 (2002)), Arizona 
(ARIZ. REV. STAT. 13-1408 (2003)), Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. 18-6-501 (2002)), Florida 
(FLA. STAT. ANN. 798.01 (West 2003)), Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. 16-6-19 (2003)), Idaho 
(IDAHO CODE 18-6601 (Michie 2003)), Illinois (720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-7 (West 
2002)), Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. 21-3507 (2001)), Massachusetts (MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 
272, 14 (Law. Co-op. 2003)), Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 750.30 (West 2003)), 
Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. 609.36 (West 2003)), Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. 97-29-1 
(2003)), New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 645.3 (2003)), New York (N.Y. Penal Law 
255.17 (McKinney 2002)), North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. 14-184 (2001)), North Dakota 
(N.D. CENT. CODE 12.1-20-09 (2003)), Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, 871 (West 
2002)), Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS 11-6-2 (2002)), South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. 16-
15-60 (Law. Co-op. 2003)), Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. 76-7-103 (2003)), Virginia (VA. CODE 
ANN. 18.2-365 (Michie 2003)), West Virginia (W. VA. CODE ANN. 61-8-3 (Michie 2003)), 
Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. 944.16 (West Supp. 2002)) and the District of Columbia (D.C. 
CODE ANN. 22-201 (2001)) that make adultery a crime, and providing source material on the 
military law definition of adultery as an offense).  See also Traci Sheallbetter Stratton, Note, 
No More Messing Around:  Substantive Due Process Challenges to State Laws Prohibiting 
Fornication, 73 WASH. L. REV. 767, 767 n.2 (1998) (confirming the above list of states that 
make adultery a crime). 
 13. All U.S. states criminalize exchanging sex for money (with limited exceptions in 
Nevada), and many states also criminalize adjunct activities such as pimping, keeping a 
place of prostitution, or paying for sex.  See Sylvia A. Law, Commercial Sex:  Beyond 
Decriminalization, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 523, 530 (2000), citing JOHN F. DECKER, 
PROSTITUTION:  REGULATION AND CONTROL 81 (1979).  Decker notes that prostitution was 
not a crime at common law, and accordingly statutory definitions vary.  For examples of 
state laws, see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-82 (2005) (“A person is guilty of 
prostitution when such person engages or agrees or offers to engage in sexual conduct with 
another person in return for a fee.”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-14(a) (2004) (“Any person 
who performs, offers or agrees to perform any act of sexual penetration . . . for any money, 
property, token, object, or article or anything of value, or any touching or fondling of the sex 
organs of one person by another person, for any money, property, token, object, or article or 
anything of value, for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification commits an act of 
prostitution.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-203 (2004) (“The term ‘prostitution’ shall be 
construed to include the offering or receiving of the body for sexual intercourse for hire, and 
shall also be construed to include the offering or receiving of the body for indiscriminate 
sexual intercourse without hire.”). 
 14. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute making it a crime for two persons 
of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct was unconstitutional as applied 
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all of these statutes violate the constitutional right to liberty.  Because 
courts have not yet ruled on the applicability of Lawrence to these 
provisions, I assume their continued validity for purposes of this 
discussion. 
B. Federal Criminal Law:  Many New Laws and Many More 
Prosecutions 
In one sense, federal criminal law poses quite a contrast to state morals 
legislation, which is clearly on the decline.  It is extremely difficult to say 
how many federal crimes there are; the best current estimate is over 
4,000.15  Whatever the precise number, the number of federal crimes and 
the number of federal prosecutions have skyrocketed.16  Different measures 
have been suggested to gauge the growth in offenses.  A blue ribbon ABA 
task force found that more than forty percent of federal criminal provisions 
passed after the Civil War had been enacted in the twenty-eight year period 
between 1970 and 1998.17  A detailed study commissioned by the 
Federalist Society concluded that there had been a thirty percent increase in 
federal offenses carrying criminal penalties between 1980 and 2004.18 
As a result of the recent legislation, the bulk of federal criminal 
provisions now deal with conduct also subject to the states’ general police 
powers.  As I have explained elsewhere: 
Dual federal-state criminal jurisdiction is now the rule rather than the 
exception.  Federal law reaches at least some instances of each of the 
following state offenses:  theft, fraud, extortion, bribery, assault, 
domestic violence, robbery, murder, weapons offenses, and drug 
offenses.  In many instances, federal law overlaps almost completely 
                                                          
to adult males who had engaged in a consensual act of sodomy in the privacy of a home). 
 15. See JOHN S. BAKER, MEASURING THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF FEDERAL CRIME 
LEGISLATION 3 (2004), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/practice 
groupnewsletters/criminallaw/crimreportfinal.pdf.  One of the problems is that multiple 
crimes are typically stated in the same section, and it can be very difficult to determine how 
many different offenses are actually created by a single section.  See id. at 7-8.  Another 
problem is finding all of the relevant sections.  Although many criminal statutes are 
gathered in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, the remainder are scattered throughout the other fifty 
titles, which encompass more than 27,000 pages.  Ronald Gainer, Federal Criminal Code 
Reform: Past and Future, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 46, 53 (1998).  Many of these statutory 
provisions incorporate by reference administrative regulations (and may punish as crimes, 
for example, willful violations).  According to American Bar Association, there are almost 
10,000 such administrative regulations that may be subject to criminal enforcement.  
Strazzella, supra note 4, at 10. 
 16. See BAKER, supra note 15, at 3 (aggregating studies from 1970 forward indicating 
the “explosive growth” of federal crime prosecution). 
 17. Strazzella, supra note 4, at 7.  The Task Force Report contains an extensive 
bibliography of articles, books, and reports dealing with the federalization of crime.  Id. at 
59-77 
 18. BAKER, supra note 15, at 3. 
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with state law, as is the case with drug offenses.19 
This movement toward concurrent federal and state jurisdiction over 
most offenses is a sharp break from the traditional view of the federal 
system.  The traditional view derives both from the historical fact that 
federal jurisdiction was extremely limited for most of the nation’s history20 
and from the structure of the constitutional system.  Unlike the states, 
whose plenary powers include police powers that extend to all forms of 
criminal activity, the federal government has no general authority over 
crime.21  All federal criminal legislation must be founded on one or more of 
the powers delegated to the federal government, such as the postal power,22 
the power to collect taxes,23 and the power to regulate immigration.24  
Although the federal government’s role in combating crime evolved as 
Congress employed its delegated powers and enacted criminal sanctions as 
one means of effectuating those powers,25 it remained the general rule that 
garden variety crime was the province of the states, not the federal 
government.26  The unprecedented expansion of the federal criminal code 
in recent years is difficult to square with the traditional view of the 
respective federal and state roles.  As the ABA noted, “the fundamental 
view that local crime is, with rare exception, a matter for the states to attack 
has been strained in practice in recent years.”27 
Moreover, both the number of federal defendants and the  number of 
federal criminal cases have increased dramatically.  As shown in the table 
below,28 between 1980 and 2003 the number of cases and defendants in the 
federal system had more than doubled, with the number of criminal cases 
increasing 240% and the number of criminal defendants increasing 230%. 
                                                          
 19. Beale, supra note 4, at 997-98 (citations omitted). 
 20. For a general account of the historical development of federal criminal law, see Sara 
Sun Beale, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 694 
(2d ed. 2002). 
 21. The Constitution explicitly authorizes federal jurisdiction over only a handful of 
crimes:  counterfeiting, crimes against the law of nations, treason, and crimes committed on 
the high seas (such as piracy).  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6 (counterfeiting); U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 8, cl. 10 (piracies and felonies on the high seas and offenses against the law of nations); 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 (treason).  These offenses concern matters, such as foreign 
relations, over which the federal government has exclusive authority. 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 7 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To establish 
Post Offices and post Roads . . . .”). 
 23. Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To lay and collect 
Taxes . . . .”). 
 24. Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 4 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To establish an 
uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . .”). 
 25. See Beale, supra note 20, at 695-98 (tracing the progression of federal criminal law 
expansion post-Civil War and post-prohibition). 
 26. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (noting the historical 
exclusivity of states’ criminal law enforcement). 
 27. Strazzella, supra note 4, at 5. 
 28. Source of data:  Judicial Facts and Figures, Table 3.1, available at  http://www. 
uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/table3.01.pdf. 
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The increase in drug and firearms cases has been especially steep.  Drug 
cases have grown from 3,130 in 1980 to 11,520 in 2003, and firearms cases 
have increased from 931 prosecutions in 1980 to 3,620 in 2003.29 
Federal criminal law is a rapidly growing hodgepodge.  It retains the 
traditional crimes that protect governmental functions, personnel and 
property, such as tax fraud, theft of government property, and interference 
with government functions and programs by bribing a federal official or 
obstructing justice.  But it also contains what some have called the crime 
du jour—legislation drafted in response to whatever crime is the focal point 
in the media—even if that offense is already defined and punished harshly 
and effectively under state law.  For example, a high profile carjacking in a 
suburb near Washington, D.C.,30 led to the rapid enactment of a federal 
carjacking statute.31  The passage of the federal law was not a response to 
any gap in either state law or the state enforcement system:  the 
perpetrators of the publicized offense were apprehended, convicted, and 
sentenced to life imprisonment for murder.32  Other new federal laws have 
                                                          
 29. Judicial Facts and Figures, Table 3.02, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
judicialfactsfigures/table3.02.pdf. 
 30. The victim was Dr. Pamela Basu, whose twenty-month-old baby was in her car 
when gunmen ordered her out.  When she attempted to save her child she became tangled in 
the seatbelt and was dragged for more than a mile.  Realizing that Dr. Basu was still 
connected to the car, her assailants tried to dislodge her body by sideswiping a fence, and 
they threw the baby onto the road.  Although the child was unhurt, Basu died of internal 
injuries.  F. Georgann Wing, Putting the Brakes on Carjacking or Accelerating It? The Anti 
Car Theft Act of 1992, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 385, 390-91 & n.43 (1994). 
 31. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2005) (“Whoever takes a motor vehicle . . . from the person or 
presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so . . . .”).  
Similar legislation has been enacted in other states as well.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 
812.133 (1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-5-2 (Burns 1994); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-117 
(1994). 
 32. Wing, supra note 31, at 390-91.  Although both defendants in the Basu case were 
convicted of murder under Maryland law, the Maryland legislature also enacted carjacking 
legislation in response to the Basu case.  See The Maryland Survey: 1998-1999, 59 MD. L. 
REV. 908, 908 n.5 (describing the legislative history of emergency legislation codified as 
MD CODE, Criminal Law, § 3-405).    
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dealt with a wide variety of conduct, including the failure to pay child 
support,33 disruptive conduct by animal rights activists,34 creating, selling 
or possessing depictions of cruelty to animals,35 and female genital 
mutilation.36   
These new federal criminal laws do not preempt state criminal laws.  
Rather, they create a scheme of dual or concurrent federal and state 
jurisdiction. 
II. WHY IT MATTERS:  THE VICES OF MORALS LEGISLATION AND TOO 
MANY FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 
In order to make the point that both of these forms of overcriminalization 
create serious problems, and that they create many of the same kinds of 
problems, I will begin by describing a few individual cases, some involving 
morals legislation, and others federal crimes. 
A.  Amanda Smisek, Kobe Bryant, James Yee, and Morals Charges 
The morals offenses are by no means a dead letter.  First, surprising as it 
might seem, prosecutions for violations of the remaining laws are 
infrequent, but they do occur.  Although there have been no prosecutions in 
most states in recent years,37 that does not mean that individual prosecutors 
may not adopt a more aggressive policy, as some have done in recent years.  
For example, in the mid-1990s a prosecutor in Idaho charged Amanda 
Smisek and her boyfriend with criminal fornication; Ms. Smisek, a high 
school junior whose grades were As and Bs, was convicted six days before 
she gave birth.38  The same prosecutor charged seven other pregnant girls 
and their boyfriends with criminal fornication.39  A few years earlier, 
women in Connecticut and Wisconsin were charged with criminal 
adultery.40  In the Wisconsin case, the charges carried a maximum penalty 
of two years in jail and a $10,000 fine; the woman was the first person 
charged under the statute since 1888.41  More recently, military prosecutors 
                                                          
 33. 18 U.S.C. §§ 228, 3563(B)(21) (2005). 
 34. Id. § 43. 
 35. Id. § 48. 
 36. Id. § 116. 
 37. Cathryn Donohoe, Adultery:  It’s Not Just a Sin, it’s a Crime, WASH. TIMES, June 
29, 1990, at E1 (quoting an expert on Virginia family law who could recall no prosecution 
for adultery in that state).    
 38. Heidi Meinzer, Idaho’s Throwback to Elizabethan England:  Criminalizing a Civil 
Proceeding, 34 FAM. L.Q. 165, 165 (2000). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See Donohoe, supra note 37, at E1 (describing charges leading to the arrest of 
housewife Dawn Jakubowski of Norwich, Connecticut, and Donna Carroll of Ashland, 
Wisconsin). 
 41. Id.  The district attorney agreed to dismiss the case in exchange for the wife’s 
agreement to do community service and take parental counseling.  Id. 
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charged both Air Force pilot Lt. Kelly Flinn, the first woman to fly a B-52, 
and Capt. James Yee, a Muslim chaplain at the Guantanamo Bay prison, 
with adultery as well as other more serious charges.42 
Although the scope of prosecutorial discretion is wide in every 
jurisdiction, the existence of rarely-used statutes invites (if not demands) 
selective enforcement and unequal treatment of similarly situated 
defendants.  There is no realistic possibility that all of the individuals who 
might fall within the scope of the statute will be prosecuted.  Statutes that 
are applied only rarely give prosecutors the extraordinary ability to single 
out and punish one defendant, or perhaps a handful of defendants, for 
conduct that is widespread.43  The prosecutor may do so for virtually any 
reason.  She might seek to enforce her own view of sexual morality or 
proper social behavior, or she might have some other goal.  The Idaho 
prosecutor appears to have been concerned with the public fisc:  the 
majority of the girls were arrested after they applied for public assistance,44 
and the prosecutor referred to the first girl he charged as a “disgruntled, 
irresponsible teenager who [brings] something into this world that is going 
to cost taxpayers a lot of money.”45  Both the Wisconsin and Connecticut 
cases involved one additional element:  a vengeful spouse who pressed 
charges in the course of the breakup of her marriage.46 
The use of these statutes is so rare that it brings to mind Justice Potter 
Stewart’s memorable criticism of the death penalty as “so wantonly and so 
                                                          
 42. See John Mintz, Army Drops Chaplain’s Court-Martial, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 
2004, at A2 (noting that when Yee was detained officials said they were preparing charges 
of espionage, sedition, and other charges that could have resulted in the death penalty, 
though the charges actually filed were for mishandling classified papers, downloading 
pornography, and having an adulterous affair with a female officer).  Eventually the 
government dismissed its court-martial proceedings, dropping these charges and sending 
Yee to an administrative proceeding in which he will be offered non judicial punishment.  
Id.  Flinn was charged with adultery, insubordination, and lying; her case ended with her 
accepting a general discharge rather than being court-martialed.  Id.  Flinn, who was not 
married, reportedly had an affair with a married civilian man.  Richard Cohen, Snooping on 
Soldiers, WASH. POST, May 1, 1997, at A23.  It should be noted that under military law 
adultery is not a standalone offense; rather, it is punishable only when it is shown to have 
been prejudicial to good order and discipline.  10 U.S.C. § 934 (2005).  However, such 
charges are apparently far from rare.  The Air Force alone reportedly conducted sixty-seven 
courts martial for adultery in 1997.  Cohen, supra. 
 43. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-6603 (Michie 2004) (requiring proof of only two 
elements by prosecutors:  nonmarital status and intercourse for a fornication offense—a very 
easy burden to satisfy). 
 44. Meinzer, supra note 38, at 166. 
 45. Id. at 171 (quoting Gem County prosecutor Douglas Varie).  The sentence included 
elements that could improve the mother’s parenting skills as well as her job prospects.  
Amanda Smisek was given a suspended sentence of one month’s juvenile detention and 
three years probation contingent on her staying in school, keeping her waitressing job, and 
attending parenting classes.  Id. at 167.  In England, in contrast, the enforcement of the 
fornication statutes was concerned with the problem of fixing paternity and providing for 
the support of illegitimate children.  Id. at 166-68. 
 46. Donohoe, supra note 37. 
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freakishly imposed,” that it was like being hit by lightning.47  It is also 
reminiscent of the problems posed by overbroad statutes dealing with 
loitering and similar forms of behavior.  As the Supreme Court recognized 
in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,48 and reiterated in more recent 
cases such as Kolender v. Lawson49 and Morales v. City of Chicago,50 
statutes that are vague and overbroad delegate so much discretion to the 
police and prosecutors that they invite arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement.  Provisions that by their nature cannot or will not be generally 
enforced invite prosecutorial conduct that is at best arbitrary and at worst 
discriminatory. 
The statutes also invite use as a pretext.  For example, fornication can be 
charged along with other more serious forcible offenses.  Charges of 
fornication and other prohibited sexual practices have been used as a 
backup in rape cases in which the proof of force or lack of consent may not 
be sufficient.51  This strategy works equally well whether the case is 
submitted to a jury52 or the defendant pleads guilty to the lesser offense.53  
                                                          
 47. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).  
Similarly, Justice White added “that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few 
cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”  Id. at 
313 (White, J., concurring). 
 48. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).  The Court struck down a vagrancy ordinance as void for 
vagueness because it did not afford fair notice.  Id. at 161. 
 49. 461 U.S. 352 (1983).  The Court nullified a California loitering statute due to 
vagueness because the statute did not adequately define its identification requirements.  Id. 
at 355. 
 50. 527 U.S. 41 (1999).  The Court found a Chicago “Gang Congregation Ordinance” 
unconstitutional on vagueness grounds because it arbitrarily circumscribed loitering for 
innocent purposes.  Id. at 53-56. 
 51. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 766 So. 2d 501 (La. 2000) (finding a defendant not guilty 
of rape but guilty of a crime against nature after the defendant denied victim’s allegation of 
forced vaginal and anal intercourse, but admitted consensual oral sex, which does not 
require proof of force or lack of consent); State v. Houston, 9 P.3d 188 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) 
(acquitting the defendant of rape, forcible sodomy, and burglary, but convicting of lesser-
included offenses of fornication, sodomy, and trespass).  See generally Falco, supra note 11, 
at 735-36 (recounting the use of fornication and sodomy laws to “obtain a legal advantage 
for the state”); Note, Constitutional Barriers to Civil and Criminal Restrictions on 
Premarital and Extramarital Sex, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1660, 1662 (1991) (providing 
examples of using fornication statutes to prosecute suspected rapists and prostitutes).  For a 
particularly imaginative use of this technique, see In re N.A., 539 S.E.2d 899 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2000) (upholding a delinquency finding based upon a twelve-year-old girl’s commission of 
the offense of fornication with older teenage boys, and rejecting the claim that the girl’s 
status as a victim of statutory rape should preclude charging her with fornication in a 
delinquency proceeding). 
 52. See, e.g., supra note 51 and accompanying text (describing the pretextual use of 
statutes in Smith and Houston to obtain jury convictions on lesser charges where the juries 
found insufficient evidence to convict on more serious charges, such as rape); State v. 
Spanbauer, 322 N.W.2d 511, 512-13 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982) (affirming a jury’s conviction of 
a defendant—charged with sexual assault of two victims—of one count of a lesser degree of 
sexual assault, and one count of fornication). 
 53. See Richard Green, Griswold’s Legacy:  Fornication and Adultery As Crimes, 16 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 545, 548 (1989) (quoting the commentary to the Alabama adultery 
statute, which states that the offense “‘may prove useful on occasions, as for example in 
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The impact of the addition of a fornication charge can be tremendous.  If 
the defendant claims that intercourse occurred but was consensual, as 
National Basketball Association star Kobe Bryant did,54 this defense to 
rape admits the lesser offense of fornication.  Similarly, Army prosecutors 
charged Captain James Yee with the minor offenses of adultery, possessing 
pornography, and mishandling documents when they were unable to muster 
sufficient evidence in support of the original allegations of espionage and 
sedition, offenses punishable by death.55  The adultery charge was a 
particularly potent weapon and potential bargaining chip because Yee is a 
Muslim chaplain and his lover was questioned extensively at a hearing 
attended by Yee’s wife.56 
Finally, the morals statutes may be manipulated by third parties.  In the 
Connecticut and Wisconsin cases noted above, prosecutors acted at the 
behest of the women’s estranged husbands.57  Moreover, the existence of 
the criminal statutes, even where they are not enforced, can have important 
secondary effects in the context of tort law, family law, and other civil 
contexts.58  For example, one state court found its state law treatment of 
premarital sex as criminal fornication relevant in denying a tort action for 
herpes transmission.59  In another state, the illegal nature of the sexual 
relations between unmarried persons was the basis for denying a parent 
custody rights.60  The legislature in yet another state reportedly declined to 
repeal its law criminalizing adultery after hearing “compelling testimony 
                                                          
plea bargaining’”). 
 54. See Bryant:  ‘I Want to Apologize’ to the Young Woman, CNN.COM (Sept. 1, 2004), 
at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/09/01/bryant.statement/index.html (on file with the 
American University Law Review) (apologizing publicly for a sexual encounter with a hotel 
employee, which Bryant claimed was consensual, but which resulted in charges of sexual 
assault, later dropped by prosecutors). 
 55. See Mintz, supra note 42, at A2 (describing the military’s subsequent decision to 
drop the charges of mishandling classified documents, possessing pornography, and 
engaging in adultery and the referral of the pornography and adultery charges to non-
judicial administrative proceedings). 
 56. Id.  See also Military Injustice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2004, at A1 (editorial 
criticizing military for its incompetent and mean-spirited prosecution and asking why 
embarrassing sexual allegations were included in a case that was purportedly about national 
security). 
 57. Donohoe, supra note 37, at E1. 
 58. On several of the points discussed, there are also state cases refusing to draw the 
inferences discussed in the text.  For a discussion of the cases from various jurisdictions, see 
Hillary Greene, Undead Laws: The Use of Historically Unenforced Criminal Statutes in 
Non-Criminal Litigation, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 169, 174-80 (1997). 
 59. See Zysk v. Zysk, 404 S.E.2d 721, 722 (Va. 1990) (applying the common law rule 
that a person who freely engages in an illegal act may not recover damages from a co-
participant on claims resulting from that act); see also Greene, supra note 58, at 174-76 
(discussing Zysk). 
 60. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421, 423-24 (Ill. 1979); accord Bottoms v. Bottoms, 
457 S.E.2d 102, 107-08 (Va. 1995) (affirming award of custody to grandmother based upon 
mother’s felonious sodomy). 
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that it’s useful in divorce cases.”61  Other indirect consequences of 
unenforced morals statutes may include legitimating the refusal to rent to 
unmarried couples and providing a basis for the use of fornication or 
cohabitation as evidence of bad character in disciplinary proceedings in 
college or employment settings.62 
B. James McFarland, Andre Curtis, and Federalizing Everyday Crime 
How does this compare to the problem of the expansion of federal 
criminal law?  There are federal morals offenses, most notably the Mann 
Act,63 which originally made it a federal crime to take a woman or girl 
across state lines for either prostitution or private sexual immorality.64  
There are also silly federal offenses covering conduct that probably should 
not be a crime, such as unauthorized use of the image of “Smokey Bear”65 
or the name or insignia “4-H Club.”66  But the far more serious problem is 
the extension of federal law to encompass offenses that are the staples of 
state criminal law enforcement. Federal criminal law now reaches not only 
                                                          
 61. Donohoe, supra note 37, at E1 (quoting New Hampshire Senate Minority Leader 
Robert Preston). 
 62. Meinzer, supra note 38, at 173-74 (quoting in part DONAL MACNAMARA & EDWARD 
SAGARIN, SEX, CRIME, AND THE LAW 187 (1977)). 
 63.  White-slave Traffic (Mann) Act, Pub. L. No. 61-277, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified 
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (2005)).  
 64. For a discussion of the evolution of the Mann Act, and its use to prosecute non 
commercial sex cases, see DAVID J. LANGUM, CROSSING OVER THE LINE (1994).  The current 
version of the Mann Act makes it a federal crime to transport in interstate commerce (1) a 
minor, with the intent that the minor engage in prostitution or prohibited sexual conduct that 
will be commercially exploited, or (2) “any individual,” with the intent that the individual 
engage in prostitution or “any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a 
criminal offense.”  18 U.S.C. §§ 2421, 2423 (2005).  In states in which non-commercial sex 
is no longer an offense, the reach of the Mann Act is apparently limited to prostitution or 
other prohibited sexual conduct that is commercially exploited.  Moreover, the United States 
Attorneys’ Manual states that, except in cases in which “minors are victims,” prosecutions 
under the Mann Act “should generally be limited to persons engaged in commercial 
prostitution activities.”  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 
9-79.100 (2004) [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL].  The provisions of the United 
States Attorneys’ Manual are not intended to create rights, and are not enforceable.  U.S. 
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra, at 1-1.100 (“The Manual provides only internal Department 
of Justice guidance. It is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any 
rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or 
criminal.  Nor are any limitations hereby placed on otherwise lawful litigative prerogatives 
of the Department of Justice.”).  Courts have consistently upheld this position.  See, e.g., 
Nichols v. Reno, 931 F. Supp. 748, 751-52 (D. Colo. 1996), aff’d, 124 F.3d 1376 (10th Cir. 
1997) (holding that procedures in the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual’s Death Penalty Protocol do 
not provide defendant with a protectable interest); United States v. Lee, 274 F.3d 485, 493 
(8th Cir. 2001) (noting that the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual’s express statement that it does not 
create rights “puts criminal suspects and defendants on notice that they lack enforceable 
rights in DOJ policies and procedures”). 
 65. 18 U.S.C. § 711 (2005) (punishing unauthorized use with fines and/or imprisonment 
not exceeding six months).  It is also a crime to use the image of “Woodsy Owl” without 
authorization.  18 U.S.C. § 711a (2005). 
 66. Id. § 707. 
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offenses that involve an obvious federal nexus—like tax fraud and fraud 
that affects the sale of publicly traded securities—where federal 
prosecution is the norm, but also many crimes traditionally prosecuted at 
the state level.  This includes crimes that at first blush seem exclusively 
local in nature. 
For example, James McFarland committed four armed robberies in Ft. 
Worth, Texas, that netted him between $1,795 and $2,295.67  Under Texas 
law (which is not known for leniency), his minimum sentence was five 
years; although the maximum sentence was ninety-nine years, he would 
have been eligible for parole after serving no more than thirty years.68  But 
McFarland was not prosecuted under state law.  Instead, he was prosecuted 
under federal law for violating the Hobbs Act, which criminalizes robbery 
or extortion affecting interstate commerce.69  Did his robberies affect 
interstate commerce?  Not much.  None of the robberies were major, and, 
in fact, McFarland stole only fifty dollars during one.70  But even a de 
minimis impact on interstate commerce is sufficient to violate the Hobbs 
Act.  This de minimis impact can be shown by proving that the business 
affected by the crime received some of its merchandise from out of state, 
and that the crime caused a diminution of assets that resulted in the 
business’ diminished ability to order additional out-of-state goods.71  
McFarland’s conduct was held to meet that standard,72 and his conviction 
was upheld after en banc review by the Fifth Circuit.73  McFarland’s 
sentence for four counts of Hobbs Act robbery and four counts of using a 
firearm in the commission of a robbery was 1,170 months, which is ninety-
seven and one-half years.74  Federal law has no provision for parole.  Even 
if McFarland receives the maximum reduction for good behavior, he would 
                                                          
 67. United States v. McFarland, 264 F.3d 557, 557-58 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam), 
aff’d by an equally divided en banc court, 311 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 68. Id. at 558. 
 69. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2005). 
 70. McFarland, 264 F.3d at 558 (indicating that none of the four convenience store 
robberies involved any physical injury to the victims and that the greatest amount of money 
obtained from any one robbery was between $1,500 and $2,000). 
 71. See generally SARAH N. WELLING ET AL., 1 FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND RELATED 
ACTIONS:  CRIMES, FORFEITURE, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND RICO § 15.3(B) (1998) 
(discussing the depletion of assets theory of jurisdiction in the context of the Hobbs Act). 
 72. McFarland, 264 F.3d at 558-59. 
 73. McFarland, 311 F.3d at 377 (affirming by an equally divided vote).  In addition to a 
one paragraph per curiam statement that affirmed the district court’s judgment of conviction 
and sentence, several dissenting opinions argued that the Hobbs Act, so interpreted, exceeds 
the scope of the Commerce Clause.  Id. at 377 (Garwood, J., dissenting); id. at 410 
(Higginbotham, J., dissenting).  The Fifth Circuit was also evenly divided on the same issue 
in United States v. Hickman.  179 F.3d 230, 231 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc).  Unlike 
McFarland and the Curtis case discussed infra, Part II.B, Hickman involved a robbery that 
left one victim dead.  Id. at 231 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). 
 74. McFarland, 264 F.3d at 558. 
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have to serve eighty-five percent of that sentence.75  As the court noted, this 
is in reality a life sentence without the possibility of parole.76 
Andre Curtis committed eight armed robberies in Tulsa, Oklahoma 
within a ten-day period (including robbing Mohawk Pizza two days in a 
row).77  Almost all of the robberies were small time (one netted him twenty 
dollars or less),78 but he did hit the jackpot twice, once at Fresh Kicks 
where the proceeds amounted to $600, and once at an Express Mart where 
the proceeds were estimated between $600 and $700.79  The total was no 
more than $2,160, and the average per robbery was $270.80  No one was 
injured, and no shots were fired, though Curtis had a gun.  His total 
sentence for eight counts of Hobbs Act robbery and eight counts of using a 
firearm was 2,271 months, which is more than 189 years.81  Like 
McFarland (and every other federal defendant), Curtis will have to serve at 
least eighty-five percent of that sentence, which is a little more than 160 
years. 
The majority of armed robbers are, and will continue to be, prosecuted 
under state rather than federal law,82 and accordingly their sentences are 
much less than those imposed on McFarland and Curtis.  The disparity in 
treatment of McFarland and Curtis compared to others who committed 
                                                          
 75. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (2005) (providing prisoners with a possible sentence 
reduction of fifty-four days per year, provided the prisoner meets specified standards of 
behavior). 
 76. McFarland, 264 F.3d at 558. 
 77. United States v. Curtis, 344 F.3d 1057, 1060, 1062 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 78. Id. at 1061-62. 
 79. Id. at 1061. 
 80. See id. at 1061-62 (accounting for $100 at Convenient Food Mart, $600 at Fresh 
Kicks, $350 at Quik Pick, $65 at Super Trip, up to $700 at Express Mart, up to $95 at 
Mohawk Pizza—in the course of two separate robberies—and up to $250 from Mike’s 
Grocery, including goods from several of the business valuing several hundred dollars). 
 81. Id. at 1061. 
 82. Compare SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, Tables 5.44, 5.48 
(Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 30th ed. 2002) (accounting for 36,800 felony 
robbery convictions in state courts in 2000, with a median incarceration sentence of eighty-
two months and a median probation sentence of fifty-two months), available at 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t544.pdf, http:// 
www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t548.pdf, with 2000 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
SOURCEBOOK FED. SENTENCING STATISTICS Tables 3, 13 (accounting for 1,721 robbery 
convictions in the federal courts in FY2000, with a mean federal incarceration sentence of 
108.1 months and no probation), available at http://www.ussc. 
gov/ANNRPT/2000/table3.pdf, http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2000/table13.pdf.   
As demonstrated by the McFarland and Curtis cases, the sentences in cases of multiple 
robbery counts with firearms escalate exponentially, because federal law provides for 
mandatory consecutive penalties for the use of weapons.  18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C) (2005).  
A second or subsequent offense of using a firearm in the commission of a violent felony is 
punishable by a mandatory sentence of twenty-five years, which must be imposed 
consecutively.  18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (2005).  See Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended 
Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penalties:  Shooting Down The Commerce Clause and 
Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1668 (2002) (discussing how Congress 
has repeatedly increased the penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) since 1968). 
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similar acts, like the disparity in treatment of the few individuals singled 
out for prosecution under morals offenses, is the inevitable result of 
overfederalization (or, in the terms of this symposium, 
overcriminalization).  As noted above, there are an estimated 4,000 federal 
crimes,83 many of which are very broad and cover conduct that is already a 
crime under state law.  Given the relatively small size of the federal courts 
(which can prosecute only about five percent of the felonies in the United 
States),84 the plethora of broad federal criminal laws cannot and will not be 
employed in the majority of cases that fall within their terms.  Rather, the 
bulk of the cases that fall within the terms of most federal criminal statutes 
will be prosecuted under state laws that cover much of the same ground.  
For example, even in the case of drug offenses—which have been the focus 
of sustained federal enforcement—less than two percent of those arrested 
are prosecuted in federal court.85  The differences between state law and 
federal law, however, are great.  The Hobbs Act cases noted above 
exemplify one key difference:  federal sentences are now generally harsher 
than state sentences for the same conduct.  Accordingly, when only a few 
robbery (or bribery, or drug, or carjacking) cases are prosecuted in federal 
rather than state court, defendants prosecuted under federal law generally 
receive a much harsher sentence than others who committed precisely the 
same crimes but are prosecuted under state law.86 
This extreme sentencing disparity is not grounds for relief.  The federal 
courts have repeatedly held that proof that many other defendants have not 
been prosecuted for the same conduct, or were prosecuted in state rather 
than federal court, or received very different sentences, provides no basis 
for relief—unless a defendant can prove unconstitutional motivation based 
on race, religion, or national origin.87  Every federal circuit has ruled that 
                                                          
 83. See supra text accompanying note 15. 
 84. Strazzella, supra note 4, at 19. 
 85. See id. at 20 (analyzing data from fiscal year 1997, when approximately 1.5% of the 
more than one million drug arrests led to federal prosecutions). 
 86. See Beale, supra note 4, at 998-99 (noting federal sentences are generally higher, 
and in some instances ten to twenty times higher than state sentences for the same conduct). 
 87. See, e.g., United States v. Snyder, 136 F.3d 65, 66 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating that 
federal and state sentencing disparity does not justify downward departure); United States v. 
Searcy, 132 F.3d 1421, 1421 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that a downward departure cannot be 
based on the fact that the defendant might have received a lower sentence if prosecuted in 
state court); United States v. Haynes, 985 F.2d 65, 69-70 (2d Cir. 1993) (rejecting an 
argument that departure could be based upon prosecutor’s choice to bring charges in federal 
forum with harsher penalties, and noting that acceptance of such arguments would make 
federal sentences vary in different states and undermine Congress’s intention to achieve 
uniformity in federal sentencing); United States v. Sitton, 968 F.2d 947, 961-62 (9th Cir. 
1992) (asserting that departure is not justified by disparities between federal and state 
sentences).  Although the federal courts have recognized that prosecutorial discretion is 
subject to judicial review if a defendant can demonstrate discrimination on the basis of race, 
religion, or some other suspect classification, the defendant bears a heavy burden in 
demonstrating that such discrimination occurred.  See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 
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disparity is neither a basis for dismissal nor a basis for a challenge to a 
sentence that exceeds the sentences imposed on co-defendants or others 
who committed similar crimes.88  This is true even in extreme cases, such 
as two brothers who were involved in the same cocaine transaction.89  
Federal prosecutors dismissed the charges against one defendant, who was 
prosecuted in state court and sentenced to probation plus the time he had 
already served while awaiting trial.90  In light of that lenient sentence, the 
federal judge who sentenced his brother thought it would be appropriate to 
depart downward from the federal guidelines range of forty-one to fifty-one 
months; he reduced the federal defendant’s sentence to thirteen months.91  
The court of appeals vacated the judgment and remanded for resentencing, 
ruling that the trial court had no authority to reduce the federal defendant’s 
sentence to bring it closer to the state sentence imposed on the other 
participant in the transaction.92 
It is important to note, however, that the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision 
holding that the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory only93 opens an avenue 
for defendants to reframe this issue, and seek sentences that are outside the 
Guidelines in cases in which co-defendants or others similarly situated 
have received more lenient sentences than those dictated by the guidelines.  
It is too soon to say how receptive courts will be to such arguments.  The 
early cases indicate a wide range of approaches.94 
                                                          
456, 465, 470 (1996) (holding that a defendant seeking discovery to help establish a claim 
of selective prosecution based upon race must produce credible evidence that similarly 
situated defendants of other races could have been prosecuted but were not, and finding the 
study proffered by defendant insufficient). 
 88. E.g., United States v. Buckendahl, 251 F.3d 753, 759 (8th Cir. 2001); United States 
v. Guzman-Landeros, 207 F.3d 1034, 1035 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); United States v. 
Wong, 127 F.3d 725 (8th Cir. 1997); accord United States v. Martin, 221 F.3d 52, 57 (1st 
Cir. 2000); United States v. Rodriguez, 162 F.3d 135, 153 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Bonnet-Grullon, 212 F.3d 692, 709-10 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Perkins, 108 F.3d 
512 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Ellis, 975 F.2d 1061, 1066 (4th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Ives, 984 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Epley, 52 F.3d 571, 584 (6th 
Cir. 1995); United States v. Meza, 127 F.3d 545, 549 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Banuelos-Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); United States v. 
Armenta-Castro, 227 F.3d 1255, 1257 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Gallegos, 129 F.3d 
1140 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Willis, 139 F.3d 811, 812 (11th Cir. 1998); United 
States v. Chotas, 968 F.2d 1193 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 89. Willis, 139 F.3d at 811-12. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 811. 
 92. Id. at 812.  The court apparently regarded the issue as an easy one:  after placing the 
case on the non-argument calendar, it decided the case with a brief per curiam opinion.  Id. 
at 811. 
 93. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) (holding that the mandatory 
guidelines increased a defendant’s sentence beyond the range established by the jury’s 
verdict or the defendant’s guilty plea in violation of the right to trial by jury and proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and concluding that the statutory provisions making the 
guidelines mandatory would be excised, making the guidelines advisory). 
 94. Compare United States v. Jaber, 2005 WL 605787 (D. Mass. 2005) (concluding that 
an out-of-guidelines adjustment was justified in order to bring defendant Jaber’s sentence 
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C. The Common Vices of Both Morals Legislation and Overbroad 
Federal Criminal Law 
As these examples demonstrate, overbroad federal criminal laws—even 
those that deal with violent conduct that should certainly be a crime—share 
important characteristics with outdated morals laws.  First and foremost, 
both give enforcement authorities far too much unchecked discretion to 
select those few cases that will actually be prosecuted.  This problem arises 
in the case of morals legislation that covers something that (almost) 
everybody does.  The relative ease of bringing such charges when the 
prosecutor (or a private party) has another agenda brings to mind the 
loitering statutes invalidated by the Supreme Court in Papachristou95 and 
Kolender.96  Those statutes were so broad that they were applicable to 
almost any conduct.  Thus they allowed authorities to (in the words of 
Capt. Louis Renault in Casablanca) “round up the usual suspects” 
whenever they wished.97  The suspects who are prosecuted for morals 
charges generally have no defense:  they are guilty of the charged conduct, 
but so are many of their friends and neighbors.  In the case of broad federal 
crimes that duplicate more widely enforced state laws, the problem is that 
the enforcement is, in effect, a mile wide and an inch deep.  Only a few 
cases of the many can be chosen, and though these defendants deserve 
criminal punishment, they are singled out for much harsher treatment than 
others who have engaged in precisely the same conduct.  Even assuming 
that the selection of cases is not tinged with any bias, prejudice, or other 
improper factor, the predictable and inevitable disparity in sentencing is 
deeply problematic.  It is the rough equivalent of a penal lottery, where a 
few unlucky individuals “win” a far harsher term than their fellows.98  This 
                                                          
into line with the sentences imposed on other more culpable participants in pseudoephedrine 
scheme), with United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910 (D. Utah 2005) (concluding that 
except in most exceptional cases district courts should sentence within the guidelines in 
order, inter alia, to prevent disparity); United States v. Wilson, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (D. 
Utah 2005) (same). 
 95. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 96. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 97. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983) (rejecting a statute for failing to 
provide sufficient notice to citizens regarding how to avoid prosecution under the statute); 
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (voiding a municipal 
vagrancy statute for vagueness because it promoted abuse of prosecutorial discretion). 
 98. Rudolph Guiliani=s policies when he was U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of 
New York provide an unusually clear example of such a random “lottery” effect.  Guiliani 
instituted “federal day,@ one day chosen at random each week in which all street-level drug 
dealers apprehended by local authorities would be prosecuted in federal court.  Alexander 
Stille, A Dynamic Prosecutor Captures the Headlines, NAT’L L.J., June 17, 1985, at 48.  The 
“federal day” program was initiated in 1983.  See Stephen Labaton, New Tactics in the War 
on Drugs Tilt Scales of Justice Off Balance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1989, at A1. Giuliani 
stated that “[t]he idea was . . . ‘to create a Russian-roulette effect.’”  Stille, supra, at 48.  
Giuliani referred frequently to this program in his later political campaigns, asserting that it 
kept drug dealers off balance because they never knew when they might be subject to the 
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predictable structural disparity is fundamentally incompatible with the 
underlying purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,99 which 
reformed federal sentencing to avoid disparity in sentencing that was not 
justified by differences in the offenders’ criminal history or offensive 
conduct.100 
1. Other values and rights threatened by morals offenses 
In addition to granting prosecutors enormous—even excessive—
discretion and creating unjustified disparity among similarly situated 
defendants, overcriminalization undermines other significant values and 
evades a variety of procedural protections.  The content of morals charges 
raises constitutional and policy questions.  Laws regulating sexual practices 
may be challenged on the grounds that they conflict with aspects of 
constitutionally-protected liberty or violate equal protection.101 Laws 
regulating the propriety of speech, prohibiting blasphemy, swearing, and 
cursing,102 seem to be in direct conflict with the First Amendment.  
Moreover, morals charges, like other consensual offenses, encourage 
enforcement techniques that threaten privacy interests.103  These techniques 
have included setting up surveillance of public restrooms and other sites 
where police anticipate that gay men might meet, and using undercover 
agents and informants to lure individuals into compromising situations.104   
                                                          
higher penalties associated with federal prosecutions.  William Glaberson, Giuliani’s 
Powerful Image Under Campaign Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1989, at A1.  Mayor Ed 
Koch identified another effect of this program:  drug dealers who were arrested by local 
authorities asked whether this was “federal day” and, if so, tried to escape.  Josh Barbanel, 
Koch Recommends Stiffer Penalties and More Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1985, at A1. 
 99. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 18 U.S.C. (1984)).  The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 provides that one of the factors 
to be considered in imposing federal sentences is “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence 
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar 
conduct.”  § 212, 98 Stat. at 1990 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (1988)). 
 100. For a more extended discussion of the incompatibility between prosecutorial 
policies that single out a few cases for harsher penalties in the federal system than similar 
cases that remain in the state system, see Beale, supra note 4, at 1002-04. 
 101. Contemporary challenges would probably be based on Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003), but it has been suggested that they could also be based upon the Eighth 
Amendment.  See Falco, supra note 11, at 733-54 (asserting that challenges to imprisonment 
for violations of sexual practice regulations could be grounded on the Eighth Amendment 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment). 
 102. See supra note 6 (listing several state statutes regulating forms of speech). 
 103. Kadish, supra note 1, at 159-65. 
 104. The sting operation that led to the conviction of former D.C. mayor Marion Barry 
had a flavor of this kind of investigative technique.  Working with the police and 
prosecutors, Barry=s former lover lured him to a hotel room where he was filmed smoking 
cocaine.  Critics charged that the lover turned informant played on Barry=s sexual interest 
to convince him to use cocaine.  See, e.g., Jill Nelson, Barry’s ‘Delilah’ Enthralls Court 
With Details of Sex, Drugs, WASH. POST, June 28, 1990, at A38; Michael York, Moore 
Testifies She Exceeded FBI Rules; ‘I Was There for a Purpose,’ Informer Says, WASH. 
POST, June 30, 1990, at A1; Tracy Thompson & Michael York, Moore, Mundy Spar Over 
Barry’s Intents at Vista; Barry’s Lawyer Hammers at Moore’s Credibility, Behavior During 
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Moreover, as noted above, the addition of morals charges, such as 
fornication, can effectively deprive the defendant of the ability to test the 
validity of more serious charges, such as rape.105  The rights to a trial by 
jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt mean little to a defendant whose 
defense that sex was consensual is an admission of the lesser included 
offense of fornication.  Indeed, the wholly pretextual nature of fornication 
charges is clear from the fact that prosecutors never charge the rape 
“victim” with this offense. 
2. Other values and rights threatened by overfederalization 
Like morals offenses, the overbroad body of federal criminal laws 
threatens important substantive values and procedural protections, though 
in ways less obvious than the occasional or pretextual prosecution of 
vestigial morals offenses.  One of the vices of overfederalization is that it 
tips the federal-state balance, allowing federal and state prosecutors to 
override state laws intended to protect state citizens and implement state 
policies in cases that normally fall within the ambit of state enforcement.  
This problem arises in a number of forms, including the nullification of 
both state procedural protections for criminal defendants and other laws 
expressing state policy.  Overfederalization also increases the potential for 
duplicative prosecutions and penalties, reduces  political accountability, 
and risks overwhelming the resources of the federal courts. 
Federal laws provide defendants fewer procedural rights than the law in 
many states.  Indeed, a recent federal publication recommends federal 
rather than state prosecution to evade a variety of protective state laws.106  
These include a more powerful federal grand jury system in which 
witnesses and potential defendants have fewer procedural rights, lower 
standards for the approval of search warrants, a lower burden of proof to 
justify a wire tap, and more restricted discovery of the government’s 
case.107  Unlike state law, federal law also permits a conviction on the basis 
                                                          
Vista Sting, WASH. POST, July 3, 1990, at A1; Charles C. Lemley, Editorial, The Barry Tape, 
Yes and No, WASH. POST, July 4, 1990, at A18. 
 105. See supra text accompanying notes 51-54 (describing the reticence of some 
defendants charged with rape to assert that the encounter was consensual, where such an 
assertion effectively admits fornication). 
 106. See MALCOLM L. RUSSELL-EINHORN, FIGHTING URBAN CRIME:  THE EVOLUTION OF 
FEDERAL-LOCAL COLLABORATION 3 (2003) (listing several aspects of prosecution that are 
less restrictive on the government in the federal system, including the grand jury, discovery, 
witness immunity, search warrants, preventive detention, electronic surveillance, and 
accomplice testimony), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/ pdffiles1/nij/197040.pdf. 
 107. Id.  In United States v. Ucciferri, 960 F.2d 953 (11th Cir. 1992), the district court 
dismissed an indictment charging narcotics offenses on the ground that the case had been 
the product of a state investigation, and had been prosecuted in federal court “solely@ to 
take advantage of less stringent federal rules concerning search warrants, wire surveillance, 
and informants.  The court of appeals reversed, agreeing that the systematic transfer of 
“state@ cases to federal court is a legitimate source of concern for the courts, but holding 
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of an accomplice’s uncorroborated testimony.108  In effect, concurrent 
federal and state criminal jurisdiction enables prosecutorial forum shopping 
to get the most favorable procedural and substantive rules.  This raises an 
issue of some importance.  In a federal system, should federal law be used 
to give prosecutors an easy means of circumventing the policies reflected in 
state laws favorable to the defense?  Some of these laws reflect values 
extrinsic to the truth seeking process (such as a respect for individual 
privacy).  Others—such as the rules prohibiting convictions based solely on 
the testimony of an accomplice—reflect procedures deemed necessary to 
ensure the reliability of a finding of guilt.  When federal law largely if not 
completely duplicates state law, these state policies can be overridden at 
the prosecutors’ whim by pulling a case with no special federal 
characteristics out of the state system and into federal court. 
Federal criminal laws also provide a way to override other state policy 
choices, such as the choice of the agency or program that receives the 
proceeds of forfeitures.109  North Carolina, for example, provides that the 
proceeds of forfeitures go to support education.110  Federal law, in contrast, 
returns forfeited funds to the investigative and prosecutorial agencies that 
developed the case for forfeiture.111  State and local investigators and 
prosecutors who develop a case for forfeiture can take it to federal officials.  
If the federal officials adopt the forfeiture, the state officials will receive 
the funds to support their budgets, bypassing the North Carolina 
legislature’s preference that the funds go to education.  This not only 
thwarts North Carolina’s policy decision to prefer education, it also 
deprives the state of the most effective means of ensuring that financial 
motives do not distort criminal enforcement decisions.112  Similarly, 
                                                          
that the courts have no authority to interfere with the executive=s discretionary power to 
control criminal prosecutions.  Id. at 954-55. 
 108. RUSSEL-EINHORN, supra note 106, at 3. 
 109. See Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes:  Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, 
or Tool for Criminal Enforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1278 (2000) (observing that state 
officials often pass seized property to federal officials in an effort to circumvent the 
deliberate policy choices of state legislatures, and questioning whether this policy is 
consistent with the state officials’ duties under state law); see also Karen Dillon, Taking 
Cash Into Custody:  A Special Report on Police and Drug Money Seizures, KAN. CITY STAR, 
May 21-22, 2000, at A1 (detailing, in a series of articles published over two days, the 
evasion of state law by federal forfeiture statutes), available at http://www.kcstar.com 
/projects/drugforfeit/index.html. 
 110. See N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 7 (requiring the proceeds of forfeitures to be “used 
exclusively for maintaining free public schools”). 
 111. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(e) (2005) (permitting the Attorney General the authority to 
transfer forfeited property to, among other options, “any State or local law enforcement 
agency which participated directly in any of the acts which led to the seizure or forfeiture of 
the property”). 
 112. For a powerful argument that the actual and potential revenues from forfeiture 
create economic incentives that are distorting law enforcement and producing self financing, 
unaccountable law enforcement agencies divorced from meaningful legislative oversight, 
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employing federal rather than state forfeiture can be a means of evading 
state laws intended to protect certain kinds of property from forfeiture.113 
Federal criminal laws provide a way to override state laws that do not 
authorize capital punishment.114  Moreover, the decision whether to ask for 
the death penalty is not made by the prosecutors in the local U.S. 
Attorney’s Office but instead by a committee in Main Justice.115  Although 
this procedure is intended to ensure that federal law is enforced according 
to the same standards nationwide, it has the effect of overriding the choice 
of voters in states that have not authorized capital punishment.  This is, of 
course, more problematic the more attenuated the federal nexus, and the 
more infrequent federal prosecutions for similar behavior. 
The expanding overlap of federal and state law also increases the 
potential for duplicative prosecutions and penalties for the same conduct, 
which are not prohibited by the Double Jeopardy clause.116  Even an 
acquittal on the same allegations in state court will not prevent a 
subsequent federal prosecution.117  Although the availability of a later 
                                                          
see Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit:  The Drug War’s Hidden Economic 
Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 40-41 (1998). 
 113. State laws generally exempt one’s residence, and many states exempt other 
property, such as the tools of the trade necessary to earn one’s living.  See Karen Dillon, 
Many States Have Put Safeguards in Place to Protect Residents from Loss of Homes, KAN. 
CITY STAR, May 21, 2000, at A14 (observing the practice in several states of avoiding state 
laws that generally exempt one’s residence and other property from forfeiture by handing 
the property over to the federal authorities). 
 114. Congress extended the federal death penalty to forty offenses in 1994, and 
subsequently added others.  See Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty:  History and 
Some Thoughts About the Department of Justice’s Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 349-50 
(1999). 
 115. See id. at 407-31 (providing an overview of how the Capital Case Review 
Committee should work, as well as a personal account from a former member of that 
committee on how it operates in practice). 
 116. See generally NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND 
ITS ENFORCEMENT 663-65 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing the relationship between the expansion 
of concurrent jurisdiction and Double Jeopardy); William Van Alstyne, Dual Sovereignty, 
Federalism and National Criminal Law: Modernist Constitutional Doctrine and the 
Nonrole of the Supreme Court, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1740 (1989) (discussing tension 
between the expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction and the values of the Double 
Jeopardy clause). 
 117. The Double Jeopardy clause is subject to the “dual sovereignty” limitation, which 
treats the states and federal government as separate sovereigns for Double Jeopardy 
purposes.  Accordingly, the prior prosecution by a different sovereign does not constitute 
Double Jeopardy.  The Supreme Court laid the foundation for this doctrine in Bartkus v. 
Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), and Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959), and it 
reiterated and extended it in Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985).  In general, scholars 
have been critical of the doctrine.  See, e.g., Daniel A. Braun, Praying to False Sovereigns:  
The Rule Permitting Successive Prosecutions in the Age of Cooperative Federalism, 20 AM. 
J. CRIM. L. 1, 10 (1992) (contending that the dual sovereignty doctrine is no longer viable, 
because now state and federal law enforcement officials work together and cooperate in 
dealing with crime—they are not two independent sovereigns pursuing independent goals); 
Michael A. Dawson, Note, Popular Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy, and the Dual 
Sovereignty Doctrine, 102 YALE L.J. 281, 282 (1992) (arguing that the dual sovereignty 
doctrine undermines the sovereignty of the people since the Double Jeopardy Clause should 
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federal prosecution might be desirable in the case of civil rights offenses 
(where there has always been some suspicion about the zeal with which the 
states may prosecute),118 should it be possible for federal prosecutors to 
have a second bite of the apple in routine cases?119 
Another troubling consequence of the expansion of federal law is a 
decrease in accountability for criminal justice policies.  For example, the 
2004 election included a hotly contested California referendum on the 
state’s harsh three strikes law.120  It is far less likely, however, that voters 
nationwide could or would focus on the possibility of occasional Hobbs 
Act prosecutions like those in McFarland and Curtis. 
The increasing number of federal prosecutions also threatens to 
overwhelm the capacity of the relatively small federal court system, 
                                                          
be viewed as implementing the principal of popular sovereignty); Susan N. Herman, Double 
Jeopardy All Over Again:  Dual Sovereignty, Rodney King, and the ACLU, 41 UCLA L. 
REV. 609, 618-19 n.32 (1994) (collecting and digesting a dozen articles which illustrate that 
the commentators on the dual sovereignty doctrine are nearly uniform in their criticism for 
the doctrine); Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney 
King, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1995) (examining the Double Jeopardy issues surrounding 
the Rodney King case and proposing a new way to look at the dual sovereignty doctrine so 
that it will only be used to provide a check on state governments when prosecuting state 
officials or when state juries are manipulated through race-based peremptory challenges); 
Kevin J. Hellman, Note, The Fallacy of Dueling Sovereignties:  Why the Supreme Court 
Refuses to Eliminate the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, 2 J.L. & POL’Y 149, 153-55 (1994) 
(arguing that the dual sovereignty doctrine is poor public policy because it encourages 
vindictive prosecutions, diminishes public faith in the judicial system, and denigrates 
defendants’ rights). 
 118. The federal civil rights prosecution of the highway patrolmen who beat motorist 
Rodney King has been justified on this basis.  For a discussion of a civil rights exception to 
dual sovereignty, see Herman, supra note 117, at 632-39; Paul Hoffman, Double Jeopardy 
Wars:  The Case for a Civil Rights “Exception,” 41 UCLA L. REV. 649, 661-66, 669-71 
(1994); Robert Matz, Note, Dual Sovereignty and the Double Jeopardy Clause:  If At First 
You Don’t Convict, Try, Try Again, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 353, 376 (1997). 
 119. Since the Supreme Court’s articulation of the dual sovereignty doctrine, the 
Department of Justice has carefully limited the cases in which it brings successive 
prosecutions, requiring each case to meet a list of criteria and to be approved by a senior 
department official.  See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 64, at 9-2.031 (codifying 
the criteria for the U.S. Attorneys Office to decide when to bring successive prosecutions 
under a policy called the “Petite Policy”); see also Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, 
Dual Prosecutions:  A Model For Concurrent Federal Jurisdiction, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 72, 75-77 (1996) (outlining the Petite Policy, how it functions, and how it 
is enforced).  But see Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines:  Balancing 
“Discretionary Justice,” 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 167, 177-81 (2004) (concluding 
that Petite Policy’s usefulness is limited because Department of Justice often fails to abide 
by the policy and courts have consistently refused to enforce the policy). 
 120. See Joe Mathews, How Prospects for Prop. 66 Fell So Far, So Fast:  Three-Strikes 
Revamp Looked Likely Till Pete Wilson, the Governor and a Billionaire Joined to Defeat It, 
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2004, at B1 (discussing the critical role of Governor Schwarzenegger 
and former Governor Wilson in narrowly defeating this amendment, which was supported 
by sixty-two percent of voters only two weeks before the two men joined forces); Dan 
Walters, Voter Turnaround on Proposition 66 was a Dramatic Campaign Event, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 16, 2004, at A3 (describing the heavy campaigning, media blitz, 
and massive campaign funding that led to defeat of a measure that would have weakened the 
state’s tough three-strikes law that originally was favored by three quarters of state voters). 
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endangering its capacity to fulfill its other functions, such as the 
enforcement of federal constitutional and statutory rights.121  Because of the 
Speedy Trial Act,122 criminal cases go to the front of the queue for trial,123 
making it difficult in many districts to bring civil cases to trial.  Despite 
increases in the total number of cases filed,124 the number of civil trials in 
the federal system has been plummeting, declining from more than 12,000 
in 1988 to less than 6,000 in 2003.125  In contrast, the number of criminal 
trials has held roughly steady.126  Indeed, since 2001 the number of 
criminal trials has exceeded the number of civil trials each year.127  
Although these statistics doubtless reflect other factors as well, the 
expansion of the criminal docket clearly consumes resources that would 
otherwise be available for civil cases. 
3. Why politics leads to retaining morals offenses and adding new federal
 crimes 
Morals and overbroad and unnecessary federal crimes share one other 
common feature.  They exist and persist, at least in part, because of 
weaknesses in the political process.  The following paragraphs help explain 
why outdated morals statutes stay on the books and the scope of federal 
criminal jurisdiction has expanded so dramatically, with no end in sight, 
and why both pose a real danger. 
Cognitive errors and biases tend to support a one way ratchet toward the 
enactment of additional crimes and harsher penalties.  These include 
overgeneralization, availability, overconfidence, and biased processing of 
information.  These errors and biases lead people to recall media accounts 
of serious crimes, to overestimate their frequency, and to jump to the 
conclusion that additional harsher laws are needed.128  These flames are 
                                                          
 121. See Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime:  Assessing the Impact on the Federal 
Courts, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39, 46-48 (1996) (explaining the increase 
in federal caseload and the shifting of resources from civil to criminal cases). 
 122. Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (1975) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3152-3174 (2004)).  See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (2004) (requiring that criminal trials to 
begin within seventy days of an indictment or initial appearance if there is a not guilty plea). 
 123. Indeed, FED. R. CRIM. P. 50 provides that “[s]cheduling preference must be given to 
criminal proceedings as far as practicable.” 
 124. See Judicial Facts and Figures, Table 4.1:  Total Civil and Criminal Cases Filed, 
Terminated, Pending (Includes Transfers) (listing the total number of criminal and civil 
cases filed in U.S. District Courts on an annual basis from 1960-2003), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/table4.01.pdf. 
 125. See Judicial Facts and Figures, Table 4.3:  Civil and Criminal Trials Completed 
(showing the total number of completed federal civil cases plummet from 12,388 in 1988 to 
5,830 in 2003), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/ table4.03.pdf. 
 126. Id. (showing that the total number of completed federal criminal cases stayed fairly 
stable with 7,576 in 1988 and 7,118 in 2003). 
 127. Id. 
 128. See Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do With It?  The Political, Social, 
Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) 
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fanned by the news media, which has an economic incentive to portray 
violent crime in news programming as well as entertainment 
programming.129  In short, there is a “fear factor” affecting criminal justice 
policy. 
Vestigial morals legislation also reflects the difficulty of getting 
something out of the criminal code once it is in. Legislators are concerned 
(and rightly so) that the public may conflate their support of 
decriminalization with support for the conduct in question.130  No one 
wants to run against an opponent who can point to a vote that seems to 
endorse adultery or fornication, especially at a time when moral values can 
dominate an election.131  Ironically, this problem is especially great when 
the provision in question is seldom used.  In that situation, repeal is not a 
high priority for anyone, so there is little to be gained in supporting it.132 
Overfederalization may reflect a bit of inertia, but it also reflects the 
problem of a (relatively) free lunch.  It sounds good to voters to pass new 
criminal laws or harsher sentences,133 but at the state level eventually you 
                                                          
Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 57-60 (1997) (outlining cognitive errors and 
describing generally how these errors alter and bias public perceptions). 
 129. See Sara Sun Beale, Selling Fear:  The News Media’s Coverage of Crime and Why 
It Matters (manuscript on file with author). 
 130. See Donohoe, supra note 37, at E8 (noting that some state legislators, considering 
repealing laws that are no longer necessary for preventing criminal conduct, such as laws 
criminalizing adultery, are “fearful that repeal would paint them as condoning immorality”).  
One prosecution may not be enough to get people’s attention.  After the Wisconsin 
prosecution showed that adultery charges could, and might be brought, a state legislator, 
who sought to repeal the provisions, was unable to get co-sponsors for his bill.  Id. 
 131. Based upon polling data, some analysts and commentators concluded that moral 
values played a large role in George W. Bush’s reelection in 2004.  See, e.g., Dana Milbank, 
Deeply Divided Country Is United in Anxiety, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2004, at A28 (citing a 
Republican pollster who suggested that the number of voters listing “moral values” as a top 
issue in voting and “the passage of ballot initiatives against same-sex marriage, proved that 
values have replaced pocketbook issues ‘as the primary political cleavage’ splitting secular 
Democrats from churchgoing Republicans”); Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, “Values” Help Shape 
Bush Re-Election, FOXNEWS.COM (Nov. 4, 2004), at 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,137535,00. html (on file with the American 
University Law Review) (concluding that, based on different polling results, it was “Bush’s 
strong grip on the issue of morality and faith, and his outreach to religious voters” that 
helped him to win the 2004 election).  But see, e.g., Alan Cooperman, Liberal Christians 
Challenge “Values Vote,” WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2004, at A10 (challenging the idea that 
support for “moral values” on Election Day was a nod toward only conservative or 
Republican issues by citing a post-election poll that showed sixty-four percent of voters 
think the most urgent moral problems are more traditionally Democrat issues such as “greed 
and materialism” and “poverty and economic justice”); MEDIA MATTERS FOR AMERICA, 
MEDIA OVERPLAYED “MORAL VALUES” AS “DECISIVE” ELECTION ISSUE (Nov. 10, 2004), at 
http://mediamatters.org/ items/200411100010 (on file with the American University Law 
Review) (contrasting the statements of different major news media commentators and 
concluding that the idea of “moral values” was too vague and “inept” to provide any kind of 
useful information). 
 132. See Donohoe, supra note 37, at E8 (noting that state legislators are loathe to alienate 
constituents for whom morality is an important issue when they think that no one is being 
prosecuted). 
 133. For a general discussion of the political forces driving punitive crime policies, see 
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must pay for them.  Most states are required to balance their budgets,134 and 
criminal justice is such a large budgetary chunk that it competes in a real 
sense with other high priorities (education, roads, salaries for state 
employees, etc.).135  The budget crises many states have faced in recent 
years have led some state legislators to rethink punitive policies.136  At the 
federal level, however, deficit spending is a way of life,137 and the criminal 
justice budget is just a drop in a very large federal budgetary bucket.138  So 
                                                          
Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospects for Restorative Justice in the United 
States, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 413 (2003); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of 
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 510 (2001). 
 134. See RICHARD BRIFFAULT, BALANCING ACTS:  THE REALITY BEHIND STATE 
BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS 7-9 (1996) (arguing that the claims that forty-nine of the 
states have some constitutional or statutory requirement for balanced budgets is too 
simplistic since the enforcement mechanisms vary considerably between them).  Only 
thirty-one states actually require legislatures to pass a balanced budget, as opposed to 
requiring the governor to submit one to the legislature, and some of these provisions have no 
enforcement mechanisms.  Id. at 10.  At least twenty states allow budget deficits to carry 
over year to year or allow deficit borrowing.  Id. 
 135. See Beale, supra note 133, at 435-36 (concluding that budget shortfalls have forced 
states to think about cutting the punitive criminal justice policies because of the high cost of 
the criminal justice system in light of the rising incarceration numbers). 
 136. In the broader context of criminal justice, state budgetary pressures are now 
creating pressures to rethink punitive approaches.  By the midpoint of 2002, many states 
were in serious financial difficulty; estimates of the total state budget shortfall for fiscal year 
2002 ranged from $27 billion to $38 billion.  Daniel F. Wilhelm & Nicholas R. Turner, Is 
the Budget Crisis Changing the Way We Look at Sentencing and Incarceration?, 15 FED. 
SENT. REP. 41, 41 (2002).  One response to the budget shortfalls has been to reduce 
sentences and to repeal or limit mandatory minimum sentencing laws, which are now 
perceived as unnecessarily harsh and fiscally onerous.  As one state correctional official 
observed, “’budget problems are making people ask fundamental questions about whether 
we can afford to keep doing what we’ve been doing.’” Fox Butterfield, Tight Budgets Force 
States to Reconsider Crime and Penalties, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2002, at A1, A11; Wilhelm 
and Turner identify thirteen states that modified their harsh sentencing laws in 2001 and 
2002, and others with similar proposals under consideration. Id. at 6 Fig. 2.  Many of the 
legislative changes occurred in states led by Republicans, and Republican governors in other 
states closed prisons as a cost-cutting measure.  Judith Greene & Vincent Schiraldi, Cutting 
Prison Costs is Tempting In a Time of Fiscal Crisis, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIB., Feb. 27, 
2002, at B9.  Some states that once led the way on harsh sentencing laws are now seeking 
ways to cut their costs by measures that include reducing incarceration.  For example, 
Louisiana, which has the highest per capita incarceration rate in the nation, enacted 
legislation cutting many drug sentences in half and eliminating mandatory sentences for 
certain non-violent crimes.  Id. at 5.  The legislature also limited the application of the state 
three strikes law.  Id.  It was estimated that the state will save $60 million in prison 
operating funds.  Id.  See also Rachel Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 
forthcoming 105 COLUM. L. REV., available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=698563 (analyzing effect of state budget 
problems on willingness to reconsider harsh sentencing laws); Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough 
on Crime?  Prospects for Restorative Justice in the United States, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 413. 
 137. According to the Office of Management and Budget, since 1900, there have been 
seventy-one years in which the federal government has run at a deficit.  See Office of Mgmt. 
and Budget, Historical Tables, Table 1-1:  Summary of Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or 
Deficits (-):  1789-2010, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ 
budget/fy2006/sheets/hist01 z1.xls (count of years in which combined on and off budget 
accounts are in balance or surplus).  In fact, since 1950, there have been only nine years in 
which the government has not run a deficit.  Id. 
 138. See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT:  FISCAL 
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there is virtually no real fiscal incentive to rein in federal legislators who 
capitalize on the public’s fear of crime. 
D. The Proper Scope of the Federal System:  Breadth Versus Depth and 
the Disparity Critique 
The inevitable severe disparity that results from federal prosecution is 
most troubling when federal law is thinly enforced, leaving the vast 
majority of cases for state prosecution.  Moreover, federal prosecution is 
troubling when there is no clear line differentiating the cases chosen for 
federal prosecution from those chosen for state prosecution.  Although 
concerns regarding the propriety of overriding various state policy choices 
still remain, many of the vices of overfederalization will be reduced or 
eliminated if federal enforcement becomes the norm for a category of 
cases, even if that category is one that has not traditionally been treated as a 
federal crime. 
How does this play out in the context of violent crimes, like the armed 
robberies in McFarland and Curtis?  There is considerable popular support 
for the federal government playing an important role in the response to 
violent crime, and one of the Department of Justice’s most important goals 
as stated in its fiscal year 2004 strategic plan is reducing the threat, 
incidence and prevalence of violent crime, especially as it stems from 
illegal use of guns or from organized criminal enterprises.139  The 
Department’s Project Safe Neighborhoods program seeks to implement this 
goal by requiring each United States Attorney to develop a comprehensive 
gun violence program, drawing together federal, state, and local 
agencies.140  To some degree the propriety of that policy depends on an 
assessment of the outer limits of the Commerce Clause power,141 a topic 
                                                          
YEAR 2004, 195, 311 (showing that the federal prison system in 2002 accounted for only 
$4,617 million of the $2,011 billion federal budget and was estimated to account for only 
$4,492 million of the projected $2,229 billion budget in 2004), at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy04/pdf/budget.pdf (on file with the American 
University Law Review). 
 139. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FISCAL YEAR 2002 PERFORMANCE REPORT & 
FISCAL YEAR 2003 REVISED FINAL PERFORMANCE PLAN, FISCAL YEAR 2004 PERFORMANCE 
PLAN (identifying the Department’s first strategic goal as protecting the U.S. against 
terrorism, and the second goal as enforcing federal criminal laws, including as goal 2.1 
reducing violent crime), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/ 
pr2002/TableofContents.htm. 
 140. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ABOUT PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS, at 
http://www.projectsafeneighborhoods.gov/about.asp (last visited Apr. 2, 2005) (on file with 
the American University Law Review) (providing an overview of the purpose and essential 
elements of Project Safe Neighborhood as well as a portal for its extensive website 
describing all of the project’s elements). 
 141. In the case of the Hobbs Act and other existing legislation, this is a debatable 
assumption.  See supra note 73 (discussing the Hickman and McFarland cases and noting 
that the Fifth Circuit was evenly divided on the constitutionality of the Hobbs Act), and 
John S. Baker, Jr., Jurisdictional and Separation of Powers Strategies to Limit the 
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beyond the scope of this Essay.  Assuming arguendo that any legislation 
being enforced rests on a sufficient basis in the Commerce Clause or other 
delegated powers, the disparity concerns noted above could be addressed 
by defining—administratively or by statute—the criteria for federal 
prosecution,142 and by more rather than fewer federal prosecutions of some 
kinds of cases.  A general norm of prosecution for a class of cases that falls 
within the federal government’s delegated powers means that all offenders 
within that class will be treated consistently, both in terms of sentencing 
and in terms of various procedural rights.  Within the ambit of the national 
government’s constitutional powers, the policy choice of designating the 
classes of cases that call for such a commitment of federal resources—
which would effectively supplant state enforcement—is committed to 
Congress and the executive branch.  However, given the severely limited 
resources of both federal prosecutors and the federal courts, the strategy of 
criminalizing nearly everything and leaving enforcement to case-by-case 
decision-making produces the problems described in this Essay.  Moreover, 
assuming that all federal prosecutions continue to be brought in the federal 
courts, the small size of the federal court system means that for the 
foreseeable future the number of federal prosecutions is subject to severe 
limitations.  It would simply not be possible, for example, to bring all of the 
current drug prosecutions arising from more than one million arrests each 
year throughout the United States into the federal courts.143 
Present and former prosecutors defend the present concurrent system as 
one that provides a federal backstop for particular cases in which federal 
resources are necessary for an effective prosecution of conduct in the 
interests of public safety.  They argue that prosecutorial discretion—
channeled by the priorities set by the Department of Justice and adapted to 
the conditions in different judicial districts—is the best means of protecting 
the public.144  A general policy of prosecuting violent offenders whenever 
                                                          
Expansion of Federal Crimes, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 545, 563 (2005). 
 142. See Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 
SO. CAL. L. REV. 643, 707-18 (1997) (proposing adoption of administrative guidelines, 
subject to judicial review, requiring each U.S. Attorney’s office to develop and consistently 
apply internal classification schemes using characteristics of offenders and crimes to 
determine which cases will be prosecuted as federal crimes). 
 143. See supra note 85 (discussing drug arrests for fiscal year 1997 of which less than 
two percent were prosecuted in federal courts). 
 144. See, e.g., Jamie S. Gorelik & Harry Litman, Prosecutorial Discretion and the 
Federalization Debate, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 976 (1995) (arguing that prosecutorial 
discretion at the federal level can effectively address Congress’s intent in federalizing 
crimes by only taking those cases where federal prosecution has some degree of 
comparative advantage to local or state prosecution); Elizabeth Glazer, Thinking 
Strategically:  How Federal Prosecutors Can Reduce Violent Crime, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
573, 575-76 (1999) (arguing that federal prosecutors are uniquely positioned where they can 
use their prosecutorial discretion to choose cases not just for the particular cases, but rather 
in a strategic effort to effectively reduce crime); Litman & Greenberg, supra note 119, at 
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they fall within the reach of the federal gun laws—like the earlier 
Triggerlock program and Project Safe Neighborhoods—can be defended on 
this ground.  Such a general policy of federal prosecution responds to the 
disparity critique as long as the basis for federal jurisdiction maps well 
enough onto the offense conduct that the prosecutorial initiative captures 
most of the cases, rather than a random few.145  But there is a practical 
problem.  The number of crimes involving handguns far exceeds the 
capacity of the federal courts now and in the foreseeable future.146 
Cases like McFarland and Curtis, however, suggest that prosecutorial 
discretion as presently administered does not solve many of the issues 
raised in this Essay.  Indeed, neither case seems consistent with the United 
States Attorneys’ Manual, which instructs federal prosecutors that Hobbs 
Act robbery “is to be utilized only in instances involving organized crime, 
gang activity, or wide-ranging schemes.”147  It does not appear that either 
case represented a general policy or bringing all similar cases within the 
federal system, even within those judicial districts. 
E. What Does This Have To Do With Mattress Tags? 
Does the preceding analysis of these two forms of overcriminalization 
have any bearing on the issue of what might be called “mattress tag” 
offenses, the regulatory offenses that many have argued are the paradigm 
                                                          
81-83 (contending that it was in fact the intent of Congress to expand federal criminal 
jurisdiction so that federal resources will be available in those few cases where a national 
interest is at stake or where there is a need from the state, and to allow federal prosecutors to 
use their discretion in choosing which cases to prosecute at the federal level). 
 145. In comparison, whether a telegram transmission between two points within a state 
happens to get routed through an out of state connection is a chance occurrence that will 
single out only a few randomly chosen cases.  See ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 116, at 22-
23, 185 (discussing cases based on such jurisdictional accidents); see also Franklin E. 
Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Toward a Principled Basis for Federal Criminal Legislation, 
543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 15, 22-23 (1996) (outlining a set of guidelines for 
Congress to use when creating federal criminal statutes that would put criminal conduct 
under federal jurisdiction).  These guidelines would require a significant nexus between the 
federal government and the criminal threat itself.  Id. at 23.  Under these principles, it would 
be improper for chance occurrences such as carjacking or the above referenced telegram 
transmission, both rather trivial connections to federal power, to provide an appropriate 
basis for federal criminal jurisdiction.  Id. at 25. 
 146. In 1994, critics estimated that the number of federal judges would have to be 
quadrupled if Congress passed a bill extending federal jurisdiction to all crimes committed 
with a gun that had crossed state lines.   Beale, supra note 82, at 1649.  Indeed, concern that 
the federal courts would be swamped with high volume low prestige prosecutions for local 
crimes of violence may have been one of the factors motivating the Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).  See Beale, supra note 82, at 1650-
60.  By holding that Congress had exceeded its authority in enacting the Gun Free School 
Zone Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1998 & Supp. V 1993), Lopez revived the 
understanding that there is a judicially enforceable limit on Congress’s power to enact 
criminal legislation based upon the Commerce Clause. 
 147. U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 64, at 9-131.040. 
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of overcriminalization?148  This is an issue that affects both the federal and 
state systems.  Indeed, there is evidence that many states are enacting more 
public welfare/strict liability offenses, and other laws intended to make it 
easier to prosecute corporations and/or corporate officers and employees.149 
Also, existing laws have been employed to obtain convictions for relatively 
minor conduct involving no more than negligence.150   
The common themes noted above—excessive prosecutorial discretion, 
disparity, potential for abuse and likelihood that other values will be 
sacrificed—do not suggest an easy answer to the question whether some (or 
most) regulatory offenses should be repealed, leaving the field for civil law 
or good judgment.  But these themes do suggest a series of additional 
questions that would illuminate the debate about regulatory criminal 
offenses, and might help to determine whether and when regulatory 
offenses should be prosecuted.  Here are some of the questions about 
regulatory offenses that I would like to see explored. 
Excessive prosecutorial discretion can clearly play a role in the case of 
the most broadly worded statutes, especially those that allow strict liability 
prosecutions.  How big a part of the problem is this with regulatory 
offenses?  Was Arthur Anderson, for example, prosecuted criminally for 
conduct that was relatively common?  Two distinctive elements of 
regulatory crime are (1) administrative regulations that supplement the 
statutory regimes, defining with greater precision the meaning of the 
statutory provisions, and the conduct that is proscribed and permitted, and 
(2) administrative agencies that enforce the relevant laws and regulations.  
The administrative regulations and the agencies enforcing them have the 
potential to circumscribe prosecutorial discretion and reduce or largely 
eliminate disparity.  How successful are the various regulatory agencies, 
such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Food and Drug 
Administration, in clarifying their statutory regimes, reducing areas of 
                                                          
 148. See generally ROSENZWEIG, supra note 3 (contending that the enormous expansion 
of the number of crimes through legislative action has led to punishment for actions that are 
not in themselves wrong, but rather are prohibited only because of legislative decree), 
available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/LegalIssues/ 
loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=44674. 
 149. See generally STATESIDE ASSOCIATES, 50 STATE CRIMINALIZATION ASSESSMENT 
(Nov. 7, 2003) (on file with author) (finding that between 2000 and 2003, twenty-three 
states have enacted or pending statutes creating new crimes, and twenty-six states have 
expanded corporate criminal liability or exposure). 
 150. See, e.g., ROSENZWEIG, supra note 3, at 1-2 (describing United States v. Hanousek, 
176 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 2000), a case where a railroad manager was sentenced to six months 
in prison for discharging pollutants due to the actions of an employee who accidentally 
struck and ruptured an oil pipeline with construction equipment).  But see Kathleen F. 
Brickey, Charging Practices in Hazardous Waste Prosecutions, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1077 
(2001) (reviewing 140 hazardous waste prosecutions and concluding that contrary to claims 
in the literature, prosecutions involved obviously illegal and often pervasive criminal 
conduct, not isolated or inadvertent technical violations). 
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uncertainty, and limiting the potential for prosecution?  How does this 
compare to state regulatory regimes (both the statutory and administrative 
aspects)? 
Much of my analysis hinges on disparity as a result of thin enforcement.  
Are the statutes in question generally enforced?  My impression is that the 
answer is yes in at least some areas, such as the enforcement of the 
securities laws by the Securities and Exchange Commission.  Perhaps in 
some contexts agency discretion can provide an important degree of 
uniformity not present when prosecutorial discretion is exercised directly in 
the dispersed offices of the United States Attorneys.  Does the regulatory 
aspect here mean that prosecutorial discretion is necessarily more regulated 
and rational? 
What about the potential for abuse and undermining other values?  Here 
the most significant issue may be the efforts to use Department of Justice 
prosecutorial guidelines and the federal sentencing guidelines to limit 
attorney client privilege, which are discussed by John Hasnas in Ethics and 
the Problem of White Collar Crime.151 
Unlike morals offenses and overfederalization, there seems to be no real 
impediment in the political process related to regulatory offenses, or at 
least not one biased toward overcriminalization.  The potential defendants 
in regulatory cases—corporate and business interests, regulated industries, 
and individuals who run major corporations—have the resources and 
sophistication to lobby effectively to protect their interests.152  Moreover, a 
good deal of this conduct is very much below the political radar.  This 
might lend to support the view that regulatory offenses are not likely to be 
subject to overcriminalization.  Indeed, recent events suggest that we have 
too little white collar crime enforcement, rather than too much.  The wide-
scale accounting scandals affecting major corporations such as Enron and 
WorldCom are just the tip of the iceberg.153  Scandals involving a range of 
criminal activity from fraud to health and safety violations have wracked 
many industries, including energy, technology, health care, 
pharmaceuticals, cruise lines, and insurance.154  However, the existence of 
                                                          
 151. John Hasnas, Ethics and the Problem of White Collar Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 
579, 624-30 (2005). 
 152. Indeed, a public choice perspective begins from the premise that corporate interests 
are so politically powerful that they will be able to avoid the forms of liability to which they 
are most opposed.  See Sara Sun Beale & Adam G. Safwat, What Developments in Western 
Europe Tell Us About American Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 89, 101-03 (2005).  A comparative analysis suggests that corporate and business 
interests (and other interest groups) are more politically powerful in the United States than 
in Western Europe at the present time.  Id. at 147-54 (exploring the influence of interest 
groups in the U.S. and Europe in general and on the adoption of corporate criminal liability). 
 153. See id. at 90-96.  Enron lost $100 billion in shareholder equity, and more than 6,500 
employees lost their jobs and pensions.  Id. at 91 & n.7. 
 154. Id. 
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serious forms of white collar or regulatory crime that have gone largely 
unchecked does not mean that some of the laws are not written too broadly, 
nor does it mean all of the defendants who have been charged are properly 
the subject of criminal sanctions.  It does, however, suggest caution in 
accepting at face value the claims of interest groups seeking to cut back on 
the scope of criminal law and criminal enforcement in this context. 
CONCLUSION 
When someone says “overcriminalization,” the first thought that comes 
to mind for many people is either morals legislation or a morass of 
unnecessary laws regulating trivial everyday conduct.  I have tried to show 
that morals offenses continue to be a source of genuine concern, and that 
they share many similarities with overfederalization, which, I argue, should 
also be seen as a problem of overcriminalization.  As the descriptions of 
some individual cases indicate, it is easy to see the unfairness of both forms 
of overcriminalization.  I have also tried to show that there are more subtle 
ways that both forms of overcriminalization conflict with other values and 
eviscerate a variety of laws intended to provide procedural and substantive 
protections.  Although these problems are relatively easy to demonstrate, 
they are far more difficult to remedy.  There are structural features of our 
psyches and our political system that tend to promote and entrench such 
laws. 
I would like to close this Essay by drawing attention to another pressing 
problem in the United States that is related to but distinct from the 
phenomenon of overcriminalization:  our alarming rates of incarceration.  
Figures from 2003 indicate that the U.S. rate of 714 incarcerated persons 
per 100,000 is not merely the highest in the world, but it is orders of 
magnitude higher than any other country to which we compare ourselves.155  
Our rate is five times as high as any of the Western European 
democracies,156 and greatly exceeds even our closest competitors, Belarus 
and Russia.157  In the United States we impose incarceration more 
frequently for the same offenses as do other Western nations, and we 
impose longer terms of incarceration for the same offenses.158 Tragically, 
                                                          
 155. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, NEW INCARCERATION FIGURES:  RISING POPULATION 
DESPITE FALLING CRIME RATES 4 (illustrating how, among the ten countries with the highest 
incarceration rate, Russia is the only country that the United States would compare itself 
with and their rate is 160 per 100,000 less), available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1044.pdf. 
 156. See id. at 5 (providing examples of incarceration rates in some countries commonly 
thought of as peers with the United States such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, 
Germany, France, Japan, Sweden, and India; these countries have incarceration rates 
ranging from 29 per 100,000 to 141 per 100,000). 
 157. Id. at 4.  The rates in Belarus and Russia per 100,000 are 554 and 548.  Id. 
 158. See generally Beale, supra note 129 (manuscript on file with author). 
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the same political, psychological, and media forces that promote 
overcriminalization also promote excessive incarceration. 
